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LEGISLATION NOTES

H. 297:

OHIO'S TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT:

A RESOLUTION TO

PROBLEMS IN LITIGATION AND TAXATION?

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Ohio General Assembly recently enacted the Ohio Transfers
to Minors Act (OTMA). 1 The new Act, effective May 7, 1986,
renames and revises Ohio's Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (OGMA).2
The OGMA, originally adopted in 1962, was patterned after the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA), 3 as enacted in 1956 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.
In 1983, the National Conference of Commissioners approved revisions to the UGMA and thus enacted the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act (UTMA). 4 Sixteen states thereafter enacted versions of the
UTMA.5 The Ohio Legislature, in an effort to promote uniformity,
sought to bring the Ohio Act in line with the UTMA.1 The result of
these efforts was the adoption of the OTMA. By adopting the OTMA,
the Ohio Legislature intended to make the statutory custodianship a
more useful and workable estate planning tool. 7 More importantly,

however, the Ohio legislature sought to remove an ambiguity inherent
in the provisions of the OGMA that had prompted considerable litigation in the area of family law and provided for adverse consequences in
tax law. 8
I. 1986 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-21 (Baldwin) (codified as amended at OHIO
§§ 1339.31-.39 (Anderson Supp. 1986)).
2. 1980 Ohio Legis. Ser,. 5-756 (Baldwin) (codified as amended at OHIO
§§ 1339.31-.39 (Anderson 1979)).
3.

UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 412 (1956)

REV. CODE ANN.
REV. CODE ANN.

(amended 1966). Under the

UGMA, the donor of a gift to a minor could have gifted property held and managed by an adult
simply by naming an adult as a custodian of such property for the minor. Id. § 2, 8A U.L.A. at
416-17.
4. UNIF. TRANSFER TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 107, 107 prefatory note (1983) (Supp.
1986).
5. See id. at 107 table of jurisdictions wherein act has been adopted.
6. Letter from R. Douglas Wrighster, Subcommittee Chairman of the Probate and Trust
Law Section of the Ohio State Bar Association to Ohio's State Representatives Senator Robert
Suster (Feb. 22, 1985) (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
7. Id.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 42-84. See generally Mahoney, The Uniform Gifts to
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The ambiguity stemmed from two provisions of the UGMAI that
had been adopted in Ohio 10 and in other states." Section 3(a) of the
UGMA provided that property transferred to a minor pursuant to the
Act was vested indefeasibly in the minor, thus giving the minor the sole
legal and beneficial interest in the property.' 2 Section 4(b) of the Act
allowed the custodian to use the minor's funds to support the minor.'
The person legally obligated to support the minor, in effect, received a
benefit from the latter provision to the extent that the custodian could
satisfy the obligation of any person to support the minor. As a result,
when litigation arose as to whether a parent could discharge his or her
legal obligation of support through use of custodial funds, litigants
could find statutory support for both sides of the question under the
provisions of the UGMA." The power of the custodian to make expenditures in discharge of the parental support obligation raised additional issues in the area of federal taxation under the UGMA. As a
result, the effectiveness of the OGMA as an estate planning device was
sharply curtailed. In an effort to resolve the problem caused by the
ambiguity, the Ohio legislature enacted the OTMA.' 5
Minors Act: A Patent Ambiguity, 34 VAND. L. REV. 495 (1981). For a discussion of the federal
tax consequences under the UTMA and the OTMA as well as the potential effect of tax reform,
see infra text accompanying notes 129-257.
9. See UNIF. GITrs TO MINORS ACT §§ 3(a), 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 366, 369 (1966).
10. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1339.33(A)-.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
I.I. See UNIF. GiTs TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 405, 405 table of jurisdictions wherein act
has been adopted (1956) (amended 1966); UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 317, 317
table of jurisdictions wherein 1966 Act has been adopted (1966).
12. UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 317, 366 (1966). See also OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 1339.33(A) (Anderson Supp. 1985) (an identical counterpart to the UGMA §
3(a)).
13. UNIF. GIFTs TO MINORS ACT § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 369 (1966). See also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986) (an identical counterpart to the UGMA §
4(b)).
14. See, e.g., Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. 523, 528, 489 A.2d 764, 770 (1985) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 69-84).
15. The analysis contained in this paper is limited to those changes found in OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986) as far as it removes the ambiguity in the
OGMA. In general, however, the OTMA represents an effort to promote flexibility and efficiency
by (1) increasing the age of majority from 18 to 21 years of age, providing, however, for the donor
to require delivery to the minor at any age between 18 and 21 years, id. § 1339.34(D)(1)-(2); (2)
broadening the types of dispositions permitted, id. § 1339.32(A)(8); (3) broadening the type of
property subject to such transfers, id. § 1339.32(A); (4) broadening the definition of financial
institution, id. § 1339.3(F); (5) providing for multiple transfers to a single custodianship, id. §
1339.32(C); (6) increasing the standard of care for a compensated custodian, id. § 1339.32(E);
(7) permitting certain fiduciaries to make a custodial transfer absent specific authority in the
governing instrument to do so, id. § 1339.34(E); (8) clarifying the custodian's rights and responsibilities with respect to insurance policies, id. § 1339.34(J)-(K); (9) providing for the designation
of a successor custodian in certain instances, id. § 1339.37(E); (10) permitting a successor custodian to require an accounting by a predecessor custodian, id. § 1339.38(A); and (11) validating
prior transfers which comply with present requirements but does not affect transfers when there
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
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II.

BACKGROUND:

UGMA

HISTORY AND PURPOSE

The OTMA is rooted in the Ohio Gifts to Minors Act of 1962,16
which was modeled after the 1956 UGMA. 17 Prior to the UGMA, the
only methods of transferring a gift to a minor were either by making
an outright gift, setting up a guardianship, or creating a trust.18 The
drafters of the Model Act were aware of the problems which existed
under these traditional methods.1 9 A direct gift of securities to a minor
had serious practical difficulties. First, the minor might waste the property given. Additionally, the minor who purchased or sold the security
posed a risk of disaffirmance to the agents who dealt with him.2 0 To
avoid the problems associated with a direct gift, the donor might make
a gift through a guardianship or trust instrument. Guardianships, however, were inflexible. They required supervision by the courts, which led
to difficulties concerning the legal rights of the guardian and minor
with respect to the property. 1 In addition, the cost and high degree of
court participation made guardianship arrangements impractical for
the estate planner who wished to convey a small gift." Trust instruments, while providing flexibility, were also very costly.2 3 As a result of
these drawbacks, small gifts of securities to minors were discouraged.2 4
The Model Act of 1954, and the subsequent enactment of the
1956 UGMA with its 1966 revisions, provided a flexible means of making a gift to a minor. The donor could create a trust-like arrangement
for the minor, avoiding the cost and legal technicalities of an actual

has been a failure to comply. Id. § 1339.39(D).
16. 1961 Ohio Laws 1550 (codified as amended at OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1339.31-.39
(Anderson 1979) (§§ 1339.31-37 amended 1981).
17. See UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT §§ 1-13, 8A U.L.A. 405 (1956) (amended 1966).
The 1956 UGMA was essentially a revision of the MODEL ACT CONCERNING GIFTS OF SECS.
TO MINORS (New York Stock Exch. & Ass'n of Stock Exch. Firms proposed 1954 draft) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. See Report of Subcommittee on Estate Tax Planning on the Uniform Gifts
to Minors Act, 103 TR. & EST. 983 (1964) (hereinafter Report of Subcommittee] (fourteen states
adopted the MODEL ACT). The 1956 UGMA did not change the MODEL ACT except to broaden it
to cover gifts of money as well as securities. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 107,
107 prefatory note (1983) (Supp. 1986).
18. See UNIF. GIFTs TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 405, 405-06 prefatory note (1956)
(amended 1966).
19. Id.
20. See Report of Subcommittee, supra note 17, at 983.
21. UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 406, 406 prefatory note (1956) (amended
1966).
22. Mahoney, supra note 8, at 510.
23. UNIF. GIFTs TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 405-06 prefatory note (1956) (amended
1966).
24. See Newman, The Uniform Gij.s to Minors Act in New York and Other Jurisdictions-Ta.A Consequences, Possible Abuses, and Recommendations, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 12, 12
(1963).
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trust instrument, 25 while taking advantage of the annual gift tax exclusion under Internal Revenue Code Section 2503(b)." The custodial in-

strument differs from a trust in that it is not considered a separate
legal entity or taxpayer. Thus, any income accrued on the custodial
accounts has been deemed attributable to the minor, regardless of
whether the income has actually been distributed to the minor.17 To
effectuate this gift arrangement, the UGMA provided that a minor was
irrevocably vested with legal and equitable title to the custodial property.2 8 Custodians were given broad management powers 29 and could
retain or distribute the income at their discretion."0 This custodial arrangement soon gained popularity as a method whereby parents could
set up custodial accounts to fund the minor's college education, while
providing themselves with an income-shifting device. The 1956 UGMA
met with immediate success, and most states adopted some form of the

Act.31
Since 1962, the vast majority of states, including Ohio, have revised their versions of the UGMA. 3 2 These revisions, and those enacted
with the UTMA, attempted to resolve ambiguous provisions of the
1956 UGMA by rewriting and clarifying the language of the Act."3
The Ohio Legislature adopted the UTMA and its approach to resolving
the problems caused by the ambiguous provisions of the UGMA when
it enacted the OTMA in May of 1986.-'

III.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE AMBIGUITY

Problems Under the UGMA: Discharge of the Legal Support Ob-

25. Annotation, Construction and Effect of Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 50 A.L.R.3D 528,
530 (1973).
26. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982).
27. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 107, 108 prefatory note (1983) (Supp.
1986) The new income tax provision of the UTMA, section I I(b), does not provide such favorable
tax treatment in light of tax reform 1987. See infra text accompanying notes 158-65.
28. UNIF. GiFTS TO MINORS ACT § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 317, 366 (1966).
29. Id. § 4(e), 8A U.L.A. at 369.
30. Id. § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. at 369.
31. See UNIF. GiFrtS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 405, 405 table of jurisdictions wherein
1956 act has been adopted (1956) (amended 1966) (states which originally enacted the 1956 act
not listed due to their subsequent adoption of the 1966 UGMA). For a list of the states which
have enacted the 1966 act, see UNIF. GIFT'S TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 317, 317 table of jurisdictions wherein 1966 act has been adopted (1966).
32. See UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 107, 107-08 prefatory note
(1983)(Supp. 1986); see generally UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 405, 408-11 general
statutory note (1956) (amended 1966).
33. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 107, 107-08 prefatory note (1983)
(Supp. 1986).
34. See supra note 1.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
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ligation
The ambiguity created by sections 3(a) and 4(b) of the UGMA
was also in the OGMA's counterpart sections 1339.33(A) and
1339.34(B) of the Ohio Revised Code.35 Although the ambiguity has
not generated litigation in Ohio, its presence was considered serious
enough by the Ohio General Assembly to warrant a change in Ohio
law in order to avoid future litigation.
1. The "Patent" Ambiguity
Section 3(a) of the UGMA provided in part that "[a] gift made in
a manner prescribed in this act is irrevocable and conveys to the minor
indefeasibly vested legal title." 6 Section 4(b), on the other hand, authorized the custodian to
pay over to the minor for expenditure by him, or expend for the minor's
benefit, so much of or all the custodial property as the custodian deems
advisable for the support, maintenance, education and benefit of the minor in the manner, at the time or times, and to the extent that the custodian in his discretion deems suitable and proper, with or without court
order, with or without regard to the duty of himself or of any other
person to support the minor or his ability to do so, and with or without
regard to any other income or property of the minor which may be appli7
cable or available for any such purpose.8
Over the years, courts have attempted to find an interpretation of
section 4(b) which is consistent with section 3(a). 3 8 Neither section
4(b), which authorized custodial funds to be used for the support of the
minor, nor any other provision within the UGMA indicated whether
such support payments could be made in substitution for any person's
support obligation to the minor. Section 4(b) seemed to allow the custodian to reduce the support obligation of the minor's parents.3 9 Section
3(a), however, stated that "[a] gift made in the manner prescribed in
this act is irrevocable and conveys to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to "the custodial property."'4 0 To the extent that section 4(b)
authorized the custodian to discharge the obligation of any person to
support the minor there was a benefit conferred upon that person and a
loss incurred by the minor since his or her parents are already legally

35. See supra note 12-13 and accompanying text (Although the discussion of this ambiguity will refer to the UGMA provisions in general, the reader should keep in mind that this analysis
is equally applicable to the OGMA.).
36. UNIF. GiFrs TO MINORS ACT § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 317, 366 (1966).
37. Id. § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. at 369 (emphasis added).
38. See infra text accompanying notes 42-86.
39. See UNIF. GirTS TO MINORS ACT § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 369 (1966).
40.byId.
§ 3(a), 8A U.L.A.
Published
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obligated to support the minor. 4 '
2.

Litigation under Sections 4(b) and 3(a) of the UGMA

In 1972, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania attempted to define
4
the custodian's authority under the UGMA in Estate of Schwartz. 2
The issue before the court was whether assets held by the decedent
during his lifetime as custodian for his minor children could be subjected to a widow's statutory right of election.4 s The widow claimed
that as part of her statutory right of election she was entitled to a share
of the property placed in a custodianship by her deceased husband. 4
The applicable statute would subject the custodial assets to a right of
election if the decedent retained a "power of consumption" over the
principal of custodial property . 5 The court defined a "power of consumption" as involving a situation "where the interest retained by the
' 46
decedent could be exercised to his own advantage.'
The court initially interpreted section 4(b) 47 as allowing a parent
to use custodial funds to satisfy his support obligation. 4 8 However, the
court concluded that this did not constitute a power of consumption
since section 3(a) prevented anyone but the minor from benefiting from
the funds. 49 The court stated that "the act nowhere permits a custodian
to use the custodial property for the custodian's benefit. '5 0 Therefore,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court disallowed the widow's claim, finding
that the decedent could not have retained a power of consumption
which would have been subject to the elective share statute."
The court's reliance on section 3(a) in concluding that the custodial property solely benefits the minor can not be reconciled with its
initial assumption that a parent could properly use custodial funds in
substitution for his legal obligation. Consequently, the Schwartz deci-

41. Every jurisdiction in the United States recognizes the parents' legal duty to support
their minor children. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES §
15.1, at 488 (1968).
42. 449 Pa. 112, 295 A.2d 600 (1972).
43. Id. at 114, 295 A.2d at 602.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 116, 295 A.2d at 603.
47. The text refers to section 4(b) and 3(a) of the UGMA; however, the court decided this
case under the similar provisions in the Pennsylvania UGMA.
48. Schwartz, 449 Pa. at 115 n.2, 295 A.2d at 603 n.2. The court made this assumption in a
footnote because neither party raised the argument below. The court did note the ambiguity in the
UGMA and expressed doubts as to whether their assumption was proper, stating that "[t]he plain
meaning of the language does not indicate that the custodian can use the proceeds of the fund in
lieu of an independent prior support obligation." Id.
49. Id. at 117, 295 A.2d at 603.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 119, 295 A.2d at 604.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
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sion has been criticized. 5
In Erdmann v. Erdmann,5 3 in 1975, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin confronted the inconsistency which Schwartz failed to resolve.
In Erdmann, a father was appointed custodian under the UGMA pursuant to a divorce court order. Under the order, the father was to
transfer trust funds previously set up for the children by their grandfather into a UGMA account.54 The decree additionally required the father to make payments for the support and education of his minor children. While acting as custodian, the father used custodial funds to
provide medical, educational, and support expenses for the minor children.55 The wife then sued for reimbursement of the UGMA account
funds so expended. 56
The issue before the court was whether the husband could properly use custodial funds in discharge of his legal support obligation. 7
The father argued that the language in section 4(b) justified his actions
by giving him the power to make payments for the benefit of his minor
children "with or without court order, with or without regard to the
duty of himself or of any other person to support the minor or his ability to do so."5a The court rejected this defense, stating that a courtnamed custodian is imposed "with a trust obligation to treat the fund
as belonging to the children and to expend it only for the benefit of the
children, not the benefit of the trustee.""
The court made it clear that, under the UGMA, a parent who is
unable to provide for the support of a minor may use custodial funds to
meet his support obligation.6" The court indicated, however, that because this was a court-created fund for the sole benefit of the children,

52. See. e.g., Mahoney, supra note 8, at 505-06; Note, Estates-Election by Surviving
Spouse-Power of Consumption-Inter Vivos Gift Under Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 12 DuQ.
L. REV. 125, 131-36 (1973); Note, The Pennsylvania Uniform Gifts to Minors Act-A Judicial
Gloss, 47 TEMP L.Q. 140, 146-53 (1973).
53. 67 Wis. 2d 116, 226 N.W.2d 439 (1975).
54. Id. at 117, 226 N.W.2d at 440.
55. Id. Testimony revealed that the father was unemployed and unable to meet his support
obligation with his own resources. Id. at 118, 226 N.W.2d at 440.
56. Id.
57. The principal question before the court was whether cause could be shown for not holding the defendant in contempt for failure to turn over cumulative funds to the children upon their
reaching the statutory age for distribution. Id. at 119, 226 N.W.2d at 440-41.
58. Id. at 119-20, 226 N.W.2d at 441 (quoting the former Wisconsin statute currently
codified at WIs. STAT. ANN. § 880.64(2) (West 1986)). In support of his argument, the defendant
father cited Estate of Prudowsky v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 890, affid per curiam. 465 F.2d 62
(7th Cir. 1972) (a parent custodian had the power to use custodial funds in satisfaction of his
legal support obligation and, therefore, the custodial property is includable in his gross estate).
Erdmann. 67 Wis. 2d at 120 n.2, 226 N.W.2d at 441 n.2.
59. Erdmann, 67 Wis. 2d at 122-23, 226 N.W.2d at 442.
Id. at 123-24,1986
226 N.W.2d at 443.
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the parent custodian was required to apply to the court and establish
the fact of his inability to make the ordered payments before using the
custodial fund to meet his support obligation."1
The Erdmann and Schwartz decisions focused on the fact that the
custodial property was for the sole benefit of the minor. Both courts
relied on the provision of section 3(a) which granted indefeasibly vested
title to the minor. Neither court, however, resolved the inconsistency
between sections 3(a) and 4(b).62
The first court to attempt to reconcile section 4(b) in a manner
consistent with section 3(a) was the Colorado court of appeals, in In re
Wolfert.6 3 In Wolfert, the husband had set up custodial accounts for
his minor children during his marriage. 4 Upon divorce, the husband
appealed the court-ordered support obligation which denied him the
ability to reduce this obligation through the use of the children's custodial accounts. 66 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that a parent
who is financially able to meet the support obligation may not use the
children's UGMA accounts to meet that obligation."' In interpreting
sections 4(b) and 3(a) together, the court stated that
the intent of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act is to allow custodians to
disburse funds whether or not the children are adequately supported.
The section does nothing to relieve a parent of the separate duty to support the children, nor does it authorize the custodian to disburse the
funds as a means of fulfilling the parents' obligation of support. This
interpretation is unavoidable in light of the fact that the gift is irrevocable and gives the children an 'indefeasibly vested legal title' to the gift.6"
Although the Wolfert rationale made it possible to reconcile sections 4(b) and 3(a), the court retreated from the literal interpretation
of section 4(b) and created its own distinction between permissible and
impermissible expenditures under the UGMA. The court construed
section 4(b) as allowing custodial funds to be expended for only those
support payments which are in addition to the parents' support obligation. Any expenditures made in substitution for the parents' support

61. Id. at 124, 226 N.W.2d at 443.
62. Erdmann has been applied in a broader sense beyond court-created custodianships. See,
e.g.. Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. 523, 527, 489 A.2d 764, 771 (1985) (relying on the
Erdmann court's broader statements concerning the minor's sole property interest under section
3(a) and holding that a divorced father could not use custodial assets to discharge his legal support obligation). See also infra text accompanying notes 69-86 (discussing the Sutliff case).
63. 42 Colo. App. 433, 598 P.2d 524 (1979).
64. Id. at 434, 598 P.2d at 525.
65. Id. at 435, 598 P.2d at 525.
66. Id. at 436, 598 P.2d at 526.
67. Id. at 435-36, 598 P.2d at 526 (emphasis added).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13

19861

LEGISLATION NOTE

obligation are, according to the court, impermissible. 8
The distinction made in Wolfert was carried forward by a Pennsylvania superior court in Sutliff v. Sutliff.6 9 The Sutliffs were married
and had four children, three of whom had active UGMA accounts at
the time suit was brought. 70 The gift transactions which created the
UGMA accounts were made by the husband and his parents, naming
71
the husband and his business associate as custodians for the children.
72
Upon separation, the wife acquired a court order for child support.
The husband subsequently used the custodial property to make the support payments. 73 The wife then sought removal of her husband and his
associate as custodians. 74 The court denied her petition, but modified
the support order to require, inter alia, that the husband pay for the
college expenses of the twenty-year-old child. 75 The modified order also
stated that the custodial fund could be used to support the children. 76
The wife appealed, challenging the court's power to authorize the use
77
of UGMA account funds in this fashion.
On appeal, both parties found support for their positions within
the provisions of the UGMA. The husband cited section 4(b) 78 as authority for his position that the UGMA grants broad discretion to the
custodian to expend funds in discharge of his support obligation. 7 The
wife cited section 3(a) 0 of the UGMA for her contention that the children were the sole beneficiaries of the custodial fund. She asserted that
section 4(b)
only grants the custodian broad discretion to expend the custodial funds

68. Id.
69. 339 Pa. Super. 523, 489 A.2d 764 (1985).
70. The oldest child, Gregory, was 23 years old and his UGMA account was distributed to
him at the age of 21. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. at n.i, 489 A.2d at 769 n.l. Therefore, Gregory's
UGMA account was not at issue here. Id.
71. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 769.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. The second issue concerned the extent to which, if at all, custodial property should
be considered in determining the support obligation imposed on a parent of a child over age 18
and attending college. Id. at -,
489 A.2d at 775-77. See also infra note 85.
78. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. at -,
489 A.2d at 770. The husband actually cited 20 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5305(b) (Purdon 1985) (The language of section 4(b) is identical and is
printed in full supra text accompanying note 37.).
79. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. at -, 489 A.2d at 770-71.
80. Id. The wife actually cited 20 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 5304(a) (Purdon 1985) which is
the equivalent of section 3(b). Section 3(b) states that a gift under the UGMA is "irrevocable and
conveys to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title." UNIF. Giirs TO MINORS ACT § 3(a), 8A
U.L.A.by317,
366 (1966). 1986
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for the benefit of the minor, and that a parent/custodian who expends
custodial funds to meet a court-ordered support obligation is expending
the funds to benefit himself, because he thereby avoids the need to expend his own assets for the child's support."'

The Sutliff court agreed with the wife's position holding that
the assets of a minor child held by any custodian under the UGMA may
not be considered by the court in setting the level of the support obligation of a parent who is financially able to support his minor child, and we
further hold that a custodian under the UGMA abuses his discretion and
acts improperly if he expends funds from the custodial accounts for the
purpose of fulfilling a parent's support obligation. 2

The court emphasized that the custodian still had broad discretion
to make expenditures on the minor's behalf. "[W]e simply hold that
custodians may not exercise this discretion in a way which would allow
one or both parents to avoid expending their personal resources to meet
their children's needs." 8 3 By so doing, the Sutliff court adopted the permissible/impermissible expenditure distinction made in Wolfert. To the
extent that expenditures are in addition to the parental support obligation, they are permissible. To the extent such payments are in substitu84
tion for the parental support obligation, they are impermissible.
As it applies to minor children, the Sutliff holding is consistent
with prior law. 85 Despite the ambiguities in the language of the
81. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. at -, 489 A.2d at 771.
82. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 771. This holding was primarily based on the public policy that
a parent's duty to support his minor children is "well nigh absolute." Id. (citing Commonwealth
ex rel. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 311 Pa. Super. 32, 40, 457 A.2d 98, 102 (1983)). The court further
justified its holding by citing 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5310(a) (Purdon 1985) which states that
"this act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the laws of
those states which enact it." Id.
The Sutliff construction of section 4(b) is a uniform one. Every jurisdiction confronted with
the issue has held that a parent, financially able to support his children, may not use the children's
custodial account to satisfy the support obligation. See, e.g., Newman v. Newman, 123 Cal. App.
3d 618, 176 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1981) (parent under court ordered support obligation could not discharge that duty with funds he held as custodian for the children under the California UGMA);
Wolferr. 42 Colo. App. at 433, 598 P.2d at 524 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 63-68);
Weisbaum v. Weisbaum, 2 Conn. App. 270, 477 A.2d 690 (1984) (holding that lower court
abused its discretion in permitting invasion of custodial funds in satisfaction of former husband's
support obligation); In re Hoak, 364 N.W.2d 185 (Iowa 1985) (holding that the trial court erred
in establishing a trust from children's UGMA assets for the father's use in satisfaction of his
support obligation); Gold v. Gold, 96 Misc. 2d 481, 409 N.Y.S.2d 114 (1978) (where parents had
sufficient finances to support minor children, mother custodian was not allowed to expend custodial funds in support of her children); Erdmann, 67 Wis. 2d at 116, 226 N.W.2d at 439 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 53-62).
83. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. at -, 489 A.2d at 773.
84. See Wolfert, 42 Colo. App. at 436, 598 P.2d at 526 (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 63-68).
85. See cases cited supra note 82. Another significant issue raised in Sutliff arose out of the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
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UGMA, one can soundly conclude that the UGMA was not intended
to permit parents to relieve their support obligation through the use of
UGMA funds. The problem, however, will be determining when the
parents have in fact used custodial funds in satisfaction of their support
obligation. This problem is alleviated in a broken family situation
where a court-ordered support obligation exists. However, in an ongoing family situation there is no defined support obligation and the permissible/ impermissible standard has no solid application. 6
B.

OTMA: A Statutory Resolution to the Ambiguity?

Under Ohio's Transfers to Minors Act, a new standard exists for
the distribution of custodial funds. 87 Section 1339.34(B) of the Ohio
Revised Code appears to eliminate the inconsistency and ambiguity associated with the prior law. 88 Section 1339.34(B) modifies the language
in the UGMA by providing that
[t]he custodian shall pay over to the minor for expenditure by the
minor, or expand for the use or benefit of the minor, as much of or all
the custodial property as the custodian considers advisable for the use
and benefit of the minor in the manner, at the time or times, and to the
extent that the custodian in his discretion considers suitable and proper,
with or without court order, with or without regard to the duty or ability of the custodian or of any other person to support the minor or his

ability to do so, and with or without regard to any other income or property of the minor that may be applicable or available for any purpose.
Any payment or expenditure that is made under this division is in addition to, is not a substitute for, and does not affect the obligation of any
person to support the minor for whom the payment or expenditure is
made."'

Under Ohio's new statutory scheme, references to support, mainte-

wife's challenge to that part of the court order which allowed the father custodian to pay the
daughter's college expenses out of the UGMA account. Sutliff, 339 Pa. Super. at -,
489 A.2d at
769. Under Pennsylvania law, there is specific authority for the proposition that a parent's legal
obligation of support includes college expenses for a child over the age of 18 if the child is willing
and able to pursue a college education and if the parents have sufficient assets to provide for such.
Commonwealth ex rel. Grallnick v. Grallnick, 279 Pa. Super. 347, 421 A.2d 232 (1980). The
Sutliff court held that in considering whether the adult child has a right to support beyond the age
of 18, both the resources of the parents and the UGMA funds must be taken into account. Sutliff,
339 Pa. Super. at -,
489 A.2d at 776.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97. See also Mahoney, supra note 8, at 500.
87. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). The UTMA counterpart
to this section of the OTMA is the UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 14(b), 8A U.L.A. 123
(1983) (Supp. 1986).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 36-41.
89. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986) (emphasis added to indicate relevant changes in language).
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nance, and education have been deleted and replaced with the words
"use and benefit." 90 Specifically added is a provision which states that
custodial payments are in addition to and do "not affect the obligation
of any person to support the minor."'" In addition, section 1339.34(B)
adopts a distinction between what types of support payments are permissible under the Act and those which are impermissible.9 2 Incorporated within Ohio's new law is the judicially created distinction found
in Wolfert and Sutli 3s which expressly states that expenditures under
the Act are not to be made in substitution for any person's legal support obligation. 9 '
1. OTMA's Effectiveness in an Ongoing Family Situation
Enactment of the OTMA has not resolved every problem related
to custodial expenditures for the support of a minor, however. One
problem which persists is that the distinction between permissible and
impermissible expenditures cannot be successfully drawn in an ongoing
family situation where there is no fixed value on the obligation to support the minor, as would be established in a divorce decree or separation agreement.9 5 It is uncertain whether and to what extent the parent
in an ongoing family situation has satisfied an obligation to support the
minor through the use of custodial funds. Therefore, it may be unclear
whether custodial expenditures are in addition to or in substitution for
the parent's legal obligation to support the minor.
The problem of preventing a parent's support obligation from being satisfied by expenditures of custodial funds is further exacerbated
by the improbablity of an action being brought against the parent for
support in the ongoing family situation. As one writer has suggested:
"In the case of a disbursement actually used for the child's support, the
effect will be a reduction of the parental support obligation unless the
custodian seeks reimbursement from the parent. When the custodian is
also the parent, reimbursement is unlikely." 96
The OTMA is consistent with prior case law in that it contemplates that expenditures under the Act are for the sole benefit of the
minor and are in no way meant to confer any benefit to the parents.9"

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
94. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986) ("Any payment or expenditure that is made under this division .
does not affect the obligation of any person to support
the minor .... ").
95. See Mahoney, supra note 8, at 500.
96. Id.
97. See cases cited supra note 82.
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The Act, however, does nothing to change the reality of the ongoing
family situation where it is doubtful whether the new provisions effectively prevent a parent from using custodial funds to discharge his or
her legal support obligation.
2.

Discharge of the Support Obligation: Breach of a Fiduciary Duty?

Where a custodian uses custodial funds to discharge the legal support obligation, an action could be brought against the custodian for
breach of a fiduciary duty regardless of whether the custodian is the
parent or a third party. In the event of such an action, the OTMA will
be subject to litigation concerning the exact meaning of the new language in section 1339.34(B).98 There is language in this provision suggesting that custodial expenditures in lieu of the parental support obligation constitutes a breach of a fiduciary duty.99 Ironically, there is
also language in this same provision which appears to protect a custodian who makes such expenditures. 1 0
Under the UGMA, the courts have uniformly held that custodial
funds are not available for support payments. 10 1 Although these holdings are primarily set forth in broken family situations, the principles
are applicable in the ongoing family situation as well. More importantly, the new language in the OTMA no longer expressly authorizes
the custodian to make support type payments. In fact, the OTMA
states that "[a]ny payment or expenditure that is made under this division is in addition to, is not in substitution for, and does not affect the
obligation of any person to support the minor for whom the payment or
98. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
99. Section 1339.34(B) states that expenditures under this Act are to be in addition to and
not in substitution for any person's obligation to support the minor. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). Arguably, any expenditures made in discharge of the parental support obligation are in violation of this provision and thus constitute a breach of a fiduciary
duty by the custodian. The custodian is to handle custodial funds as would a "prudent person of
discretion and intelligence dealing with the property of another." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1339.34(E) (Anderson Supp. 1986). This language vaguely defines a breach of a fiduciary duty;
however, other language within the OTMA provides more clarity: "A custodian not compensated
for his services is not liable for losses to the custodial property unless they result from his bad
faith, intentional wrongdoing, or gross negligence or from his failure to maintain the standard of
prudence in investing the custodial property ....."Id. § 1339.35(E).
It is arguable that to the extent that custodial expenditures are used in satisfaction of the
legal support obligation the custodial property is being "lossed" since the expenditure otherwise
would be the obligation of the parents. Thus, the remaining question is whether the loss has resulted from bad faith, intentional wrongdoing, gross negligence, or imprudence on the part of the
custodian. Id. Although a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty may exist, the likelihood
of success is diminished in light of the above language of the code which creates a high standard
of proof for the plaintiff.
100. A custodian may make expenditures "with or without regard to the duty or ability of
the custodian or of any other person to support the minor." Id.
101. See cases cited supra note 82.
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expenditure is made.' 0 2 The language used here indicates that the legislature intended to prohibit the use of custodial funds to discharge the
parent's legal support obligation. This interpretation is supported by
section 1339.33(A) which provides, as it did under the old Act, that the
minor has absolute indefeasible legal title over the custodial
property.' 0 3
Although the OTMA no longer expressly allows support expenditures, it does not definitively prohibit custodial expenditures in discharge of the legal support obligation.' 04 Instead, the OTMA authorizes the custodian to make expenditures in his discretion for the "use
and benefit" of the minor "with or without regard to the duty or ability of the custodian or of any other person to support the minor or his
ability to do so.''105 The terms "use and benefit" are broad enough to
include expenditures that would otherwise represent a parental support
obligation.? 6
The argument that section 1339.34(B) acts as an absolute prohibition on the use of custodial funds in satisfaction of the parent's legal
support obligation is weakened by a close examination of the words
chosen in the new clause. The new language added to section
1339.34(B) states that "[a]ny payment or expenditure that is made
under this division is in addition to, is not in substitution for, and does
not effect the obligation of any person to support the minor for whom
the payment or expenditure is made.' 0 7 The choice of words used here
does not clearly convey a mandatory or prohibitory intent. If the Ohio
legislature intended to create an absolute prohibition on any custodial
expenditures which affect the legal obligation to support the minor,
stronger language could have been chosen. Section 1339.34(B) could
have provided that "any expenditure that is made under this subdivishall
sion shall be in addition to, shall not be in substitution for, and
08
minor.'
the
support
to
person
any
of
obligation
the
not affect

102. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
103. Id. § 1339.33(A).
104. Id. § 1339.34(B).
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See, e.g.. Huffman v. Chasteen, 307 Ky. 1, 6, 209 S.W.2d 705, 708 (1948) (The words
"use and benefit" generally have a much broader meaning than the words "maintenance and
support."); see also Sexton v. Cronkhite, 74 Ind. App. 245, 250, 127 N.E. 829, 830 (1920) (The
words "use and benefit" are words of wide application.).
107. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
108. This argument is further supported by the comment to section 14 of the UTMA after
which section 1339.34 of the OTMA is modeled. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 14, 8A
U.L.A. at 123 comment (1983) (Supp. 1986). The comment discusses the possible methods of
avoiding income attribution to the person legally obligated to support the minor. Id. The method
specifically rejected by the drafters as being too restrictive was that which would "prohibit the use
of custodial property or its income for [the] purpose" of support. Id.
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Moreover, an absolute prohibition would be untenable because of
the restrictions it would place upon the custodian's ability to make expenditures for the use and benefit of the minor.10 9 Such a construction
would require the custodian to ascertain the value of the parent's legal
obligation to support the minor before making any expenditures, so as
not to affect that obligation. Given the imprecise nature of the parental
support obligation, the custodian would be unable to make expenditures
for the "use and benefit of the minor" without subjecting himself to a
lawsuit for reimbursement of the custodial funds he "improperly" disbursed.1 10 As a result, the Act would be transformed into an instrument
analogous to an accumulation trust"' with only extraordinary expenditures being made until the minor reaches the age of distribution.
Such a chilling effect surely was not within the contemplation of
the OTMA drafters.' Other language within section 1339.34(B) indicates that the legislature intended to confer broad discretion to the custodian in making disbursements. Part of the provision states that the
custodian may make expenditures for the use and benefit of the minor
as
the custodian in his discretion considers suitable and proper, with or
without court order, with or without regard to the duty or ability of the
custodian or of any other person to support the minor or his ability to
do so, and with or without regard to any other income or property of the
minor that may be applicable or available for any purpose."13
Given this broad discretionary language, a parent custodian. in an
ongoing family situation could use the custodial funds to discharge his
or her legal obligation to support the minor with few, if any, adverse
consequences. First, it is unlikely that the minor child would file a lawsuit against his parents for reimbursement of the improperly used
funds. 1 4 Second, the litigation involved would be problematic in that
the court would be burdened with the task of distinguishing permissible

109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Erdmann, 67 Wis. 2d at 116, 226 N.W.2d at 439 (wife sought reimbursement where husband improperly used custodial assets to discharge his legal obligation). See supra
text accompanying notes 53-62 (discussing the Erdmann case). See also supra note 99.
111. An accumulation trust is "[a] trust in which the trustee is directed to accumulate
income for a period of time before distribution." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 21 (5th ed. 1979).
112. One of the original purposes of the UGMA was to avoid the restrictions of using a
guardianship to manage the minor's money. See Mahoney, supra note 8, at 510.
113. OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
114. This author has found no reported cases where a minor has sued a parent custodian for
using the fund to discharge the legal obligation to support the minor. Moreover, the drafters of the
UTMA implicitly ruled out providing the minor with a cause of action in the event that his
parents use custodial funds in satisfaction of their legal obligation. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS
ACT § 14, 8A U.L.A. at 123 comment (1983).
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.from impermissible expenditures under the OTMA 11 5 without a fixed
value on the obligation of support.11 6 Finally, even if a lawsuit were
brought, the parent-custodian would be protected by the broad discre1
tionary powers established by the language in section 1339.34(B)."
Not only can the OTMA be read to allow a parent-custodian to
discharge his or her legal support obligation with custodial funds, but
the OTMA can also be read to enable a third-party custodian who is
not the minor's parent to discharge the legal support obligation of the
parent. The custodian is under no duty to make a definitive determination as to the parental obligation of support before making expenditures. The language used in section 1339.34(B) does not convey a
mandatory or prohibitory intent that no expenditures under the OTMA
shall affect the obligation to support the minor.1 8 Furthermore, it is
inconceivable that expenditures made by the custodian would not affect
the obligation to support the minor."9 However, section 1339.34(B)
also states that "[a]ny payment or expenditure that is made under this
division . . . does not affect the obligation of any person to support the
minor.""2 In light of the broad discretion conferred upon the custodian
to make expenditures under section 1339.34(B), it is anomalous for
that same subparagraph to state that such expenditures do not affect
the obligation of any person to support the minor.'
The above result raises a question as to why the legislature drafted
section 1339.34(B) in such a vague and ambiguous manner. Although
the language conveys a general rule that payments under the OTMA
are not to absolve parents of their support duty,1 22 it does not successfully provide a cause of action for breach of a fiduciary duty if the
custodian expends funds which relieve the legal support obligation.1 23
The question may be answered by consideration of the dangers associated with a strict prohibition. The general rule is designed to prevent
future cases such as Sutliff from arising in Ohio.1 24 It appears, how-

l15. The court would have to determine (I) what the parent's support obligation is and (2)
whether the expenditures are in addition to or in substitution for the support obligation. See OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
116. See supra text accompanying note 95.
117. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). The parent's defense would be that he or she made such expenditures "with or without" regard to his or her
ability to support the minor and, therefore, acted well within his or her powers as custodian. Id.
118. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 107-108.
119. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). (Expenditures may be
made "with or without regard to the duty or ability" of any person's support obligation.).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. Id.
122. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 101-103.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 98-121.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 69-84. Despite the vague language in section
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
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ever, that the Ohio legislature carefully chose the language in achieving
this goal so as not to be too restrictive on the custodian's ability to
make expenditures. If the Act provided a cause of action against the
custodian whenever custodial expenditures impermissibly affected the
parental support obligation, the utility of the Act as a planning device
would be significantly diminished. 2 5 The custodian would be subject to
liability for making expenditures which affected the support obligation.
Over the years the courts have been expanding the parameters of what
is included in the parent's obligation of support, yet uncertainty remains. 26 To ensure that custodians could make expenditures for the
use and benefit of the minor without incurring undue risk, the legislature set out to retain the custodian's broad discretion and control over
expenditures and thereby maintain the flexibility provided under the
UGMA. 27 To achieve this, the legislature had to stop short of an absolute prohibition on expenditures that affect the parental obligation of
support. 2 '
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE TAX CONSEQUENCES UNDER THE STATUTORY

CUSTODIANSHIP:

UGMA

VERSUS

OTMA

Another potential reason for the language chosen in section
1339.34(B) is evident when considering the tax consequences under the
UGMA. The ambiguity between sections 3(a) and 4(b) of the UGMA
resulted in inconsistent federal tax treatment. A gift to a child made
under the UGMA had beneficial tax consequences because the gift
would qualify as a transfer of a present interest tothe child for the
purposes of the $10,000 per donee gift tax exclusion. 12 9 Treatment of
the gift as a transfer of a present interest, rather than an incomplete
gift, was based on the language in section 3(a) of the UGMA which
provided that the minor donee took absolute vested title to the custodial
property at the time the gift was made. 3 0 The Internal Revenue Service ignored section 3(a), however, for the purposes of income and estate taxation.' 3a Instead, the Service has relied upon section 4(b) which

1339.34(B), cases such as Sutliff will effectively be prevented. See supra text accompanying notes
93-94.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
126. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 108.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 104-11.
129. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 C.B. 449.
130. Id.
131. The Internal Revenue Service's position with regards to income taxation under the
UGMA is set out in Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23. See also infra text accompanying notes
134-39. The Service's position on estate taxation under the UGMA is set out in Rev. Rul. 57-366,
1957-2 by
C.B.eCommons,
618. See also1986
infra text accompanying notes 177-86.
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gave the custodian the power to use the funds for support of the minor. 132 Relying on section 4(b), the Service concluded that the minor's
parents also had an interest in custodial funds used to support the minor. This conclusion served as a basis for both adverse income and estate tax consequences. 1 3 Although this tax treatment appeared inconsistent, irreconcilable, and inappropriate, the inconsistency between
sections 3(a) and 4(b) of the UGMA permitted such a result.
A.

Income Taxation

1. Income Taxation Under the UGMA
Although recent changes in the tax law limit the utility of this
devise for children aged less than fourteen years, the typical donor of
custodial property intends income produced from the property to be
taxed to the donee. The Internal Revenue Service, however, promulgated Revenue Ruling 56-484134 which states that income on custodial
property is taxed to any person owing a legal obligation to support the
minor, to the extent that income is actually used to discharge the obligation.13 5 The ruling is based upon the provision of the Model Act
which authorized the custodian to use funds from both the income and
corpus to support the minor.13 6 Revenue Ruling 56-484 has been criticized by some commentators for ignoring the provision of the Model
Act which stated that the minor had absolute and indefeasible title. "
For income tax purposes, the minor's interest in the custodial fund was
not considered to be indefeasible, rather it was considered by the Service to be subject to the custodian's discretionary use of funds in discharge of the parent's support obligation. 3 8 As a result, Revenue Ruling 56-484 diminished the attractiveness of the UGMA as an estate

132. See UNIF. GiF'rS TO MINORS ACT § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 369 (1966).
133. See supra note 131.
134. 1956-2 C.B. 23.
135. Id. at 24. This determination, made with regard to the Model Act, was affirmed and
applied to the 1956 UGMA. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212. The ruling is consistent with a
Code provision which taxes trust income to the grantor, to the extent such income is applied in
support of a beneficiary whom the grantor has a legal obligation to support. I.R.C. § 677(b)
(1982). See infra text accompanying notes 140-47.
136. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23, 24. The ruling was relied upon in Commissioner v.
Friedman, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 714, 725 (1968), afid, 421 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1970). The taxpayers
in Friedman held dividends from securities for their children under Ohio's UGMA. Id. The court
relied on Revenue Ruling 56-484 in holding that the dividends were includable in the parents'
gross income. Id. The court stated that "the dividends on all shares so held were freely used by the
petitioners to satisfy their personal obligations, including their obligation to support their children." Id.
137. See generally Mahoney, supra note 8, at 519-20.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
138. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23, 24.

19861

LEGISLATION NOTE

planning device."3 9 The Service's position threatened most custodianships since typically donors intend to have the custodial property available for distribution to the donee whom the donor, or a member of the
donor's family, is obligated to support.
2.

Income Taxation Under the OTMA

The Service's position analogized the UGMA custodianship to a
trust instrument. 10 An express provision in a trust, like that found in
the UGMA, allowing trust income to be used for the minor's support,
"qualifies the property interest transferred to the minor under
such a
trust . . . so as to permit the use of all or a part of the income therefrom to be diverted."'' When a trustee is not given the power to make
support payments, state law prohibits him from using income from the
trust for support of the minor.""
Although the rules governing taxation of trusts are not applicable
to statutory transfers, they offer a rational for the Service's treatment
of the UGMA gift." 3 Under Internal Revenue Code section 667(a), a
grantor of a trust is taxable on trust income that may be used to discharge any of his legal obligations. 4 ' In a support situation, however,
Internal Revenue Code section 667(b) limits income taxation to the
extent of income actually used in discharge of the support obligation." Under section 4(b) of the UGMA, the custodian had the ability
to use the funds in discharge of the parent's legal support obligation." 6
A grantor having the same powers which the custodian had under section 4(b) of the UGMA would be taxed on trust income actually used
in discharge of the grantor's legal obligation to support the minor."'
In order to avoid this type of taxation it is advisable under trust
law to expressly prohibit the trustee from making any payments in discharge of the parent's legal obligation." 8 The Ohio legislature appar-

139. See Newman, supra note 24, at 40 n.138.
140. Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23, 24.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. I.R.C. § 677(a) (1982).
145. Id. § 677(b).
146. UNIF. GiFTS TO MINORS ACT § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 369 (1966).
147. See, e.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942) (trust expressly authorized income
to be expended for the "education, support, and maintenance" of the minor). The Court stated
that the possibility of the use of the income to relieve the grantor of his parental obligation was
sufficient to tax the grantor on the entire income. Id. at 170. Today, this rule is limited by I.R.C.
§ 677(b) which taxes the grantor of such a trust only to the extent such income is actually used to
satisfy the parental obligation. I.R.C. § 667(b) (1982).
148. Miller, Appropriate Forms of Gifts to Minors, 16 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 765, 770
Published
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ently had this in mind when rewriting Ohio's counterpart to section
4(b) of the UGMA. The new standard for distribution under the
OTMA appears to negate the implication that custodial funds can be
1 9
used to satisfy the legal obligation to support the minor. " Under section 1339.34(B) the custodian is no longer expressly authorized to
make support payments.' 50 Rather, the custodian may, in his discre51
tion, expend funds for the "use and benefit" of the minor.
Using a trust analogy to determine the tax consequences under the
OTMA custodianship, the words "use" and "benefit" standing alone
would certainly not avoid the risk of income taxation to the parent. The
broad scope of the terms "use" and "benefit" unquestionably includes
support expenditures.152 Thus, under section 677(b) of the Internal
Revenue Code, any funds used to make expenditures for the support or
maintenance of a minor whom the grantor is legally obligated to sup5 3 In order to avoid this result the
port would be taxed to the grantor.
Ohio legislature appended a new clause to section 1339.34(B), which
states that "payments under [the Act] do not affect the obligation of
'
any person to support the minor."' This language attempts to negate
any implication that custodial property can be used in satisfaction of
the parental support obligation.' 55 Such language, however, will most
likely be viewed as merely exalting form over substance. The implication may be negated, but the power remains. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the new Act it is evident that the custodian still
56
has the ability to discharge the obligation to support the minor.' The
legislature has used language by which it hoped to magically turn custodial payments used to support a minor into something other than support payments. However, clever drafting cannot change the reality of
the situation. Consequently, under the OTMA, the minor's parent will
be unable to avoid the risk of income taxation to the extent custodial
5
expenditures actually discharge their support obligation. 7 This risk

149. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). See also UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT § 14, 8A U.L.A. 123 comment (The change in the standard for distribution
is "intended to avoid the implication that the custodial property can be used only for the required
support of the minor.).
150. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
151. Id.
152. See supra text accompanying note 106.
153. I.R.C. § 677(b) (1982).
154. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
155. Id. See also supra note 149.
156. Amended section 1339.34(B) grants the custodian broad discretion in making expenditures "with or without regard to the duty or ability of the custodian or of any other person to
support the minor.". OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). See also supra
text accompanying notes 104-21.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
157. See Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23, 24 (discussed supra text accompanying notes
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has a direct impact on the utility of the OTMA as an income-shifting
device for children fourteen or older.
3.

OTMA as an Income-Shifting Device
a.

Tax Reform 1987

Under the Tax Reform Act of 1987,'15 income produced by prop-

erty owned by a minor under the age of fourteen is taxed at the parents' top marginal rate, 6 9 regardless of how or from whom the property was acquired and regardless of how the income is used. This
eliminates the utility of a UTMA/OTMA transfer of income-producing property as an income-shifting device for transfers to minors under
the age of fourteen. For minors fourteen years of age and older, such a
transfer may still result in overall tax savings for a family, since income
from property owned by the minor is taxed at the minor's presumably
lower tax rate. 160
Where the income is not otherwise taxed to the parent, there may
be income tax consequences from use of custodial income. The parent's
legal obligation to support a minor child is an enforceable "debt." Discharge of indebtedness, by the party to whom the debt is owed or by a
third party, constitutes taxable income to the debtor.' 6 1 The Internal
Revenue Service asserted that any person owing a legal obligation to
support a minor realizes taxable gross income to the extent expenditures are actually made from custodial funds which would otherwise
have to be made as part of the legal support obligaiton."'2
Income is realized, not according to the availability of custodial
income for support of the minor 63 nor according to the propriety of
expenditures from custodial funds for support of the minor, but only
according to the extent such expenditures are actually made. Regardless of any intent to discourage the use of custodial funds in discharge

134-39).
158. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered section of tits.
16, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 42, 46, and 49 U.S.C.) (1986).
159. 26 U.S.C.A. § I(i) (Special Pamphlet 1986).
160. The custodial instrument, unlike a trust, does not establish a separate tax-paying entity, and all income produced by the property is attributable to the minor, whether or not distributed. UNIF. TRANSFERS TO MINORS ACT, 8A U.L.A. 105, 105 prefatory note (1983) (Supp. 1986).
161. The Internal Revenue Code provides that "gross income means all income from
whatever source derived, including . . . [i]ncome from discharge of indebtedness." I.R.C. §
61(a)(12) (1982). See also Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929) (employer's payment of federal income tax obligation of the debtor-employee represented additional
income to the debtor in that amount).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 134-39.
163. "For support" is used here to refer to expenditures which would be required as part of
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1 64
of a support obligation to the minor, the OTMA does not absolutely
prohibit such use.' 65 Thus, actual expenditures from custodial funds
under the OTMA for support of the minor will undoubtedly constitute
taxable income to the person owing a legal obligation to support that
minor. Taxation based on actual expenditures in support of the minor is
clear in principle. The confusion arises in attempting to define and
identify the legal support obligation.

b.

Defining The Legal Support Obligation

Treasury regulations under section 1.662(a)-4 define "legal obligation" as an obligation of support that is not affected by the adequacy of
66
the dependent's own resources.1 Generally, the policy is to look to
6 For example, if
state law to determine the parent's legal obligation.
under local law a parent is not allowed to use the child's resources for
the child's support, that parent has a legal obligation to support the
69
child as long as he or she 168 is financially able to do so.' The problem
lies in ascertaining the extent of the parent's legal70obligation to support
the minor. This is an area of great uncertainty.1
"Support" is commonly defined as including only the "necessaries

of life."' 17 In a majority of jurisdictions, including Ohio, expenditures

for private schooling, music and dance lessons, or other similar expenses are not considered to be included within the "necessaries of
life".'7 Some jurisdictions have imposed a parental support obligation

164. Under the OTMA, expenditures from custodial funds do not affect the obligation of
to support the minor. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1984).
person
any
165. The custodian is given broad discretion to make expenditures for the "use and benefit"
of the minor, "with or without regard to the duty or ability of the custodian or of any other person
to support the minor." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986). See also
supra text accompanying notes 104-121.
166. Treas. Reg. § 1.662(a)-4 (1960).
167. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Rev. Rul. 56-484, 1956-2 C.B. 23.
See also Braun v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 210 (1984) (discussed infra at note 176).
168. Most jurisdictions now place an equal burden on both the father and mother; holding
prior law, placing the primary obligation on the father, violative of the equal protection clause of
the constitution. See, e.g.. Estate of Weisskopf, 39 Ill. App. 2d 380, 188 N.E.2d 726 (1963); Carol
K. v Arnold K., 85 Misc. 2d 643, 380 N.Y.S.2d 593 (1976). Ohio, however, makes the father
primarily liable for supporting his children with his wife having a duty to assist so far as she is
able. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Anderson 1979).
169. See B. BITTKER. 3 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS, § 80.4.4
(1981).
170. See generally Nitzburg, The Obligation of Support: A Proposed Federal Standard, 23
TAX L. REV. 93 (1967); Pednick, Familial Obligations and Federal Taxation: A Modest Suggestion, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 53 (1956).
171. See 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parent and Child § 55 (1971).
172. For a concise overview of how each state defines the parents legal obligation by statute
and case law, see Blake, Parent's Legal Obligation of Support After the Braun Discussion, 10
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
Tax Mgmt. (BNA) 154, 160-64 (Sept.-Oct. 1985). This author has found no case law in Ohio
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beyond the "necessaries of life." '7 3 Private schooling, for example, has
been held a part of the parent's legal obligation.174
The uncertainty involved in assessing the extent of the parental
support obligation presents a risk of income attribution to the minor's
parent whenever certain support distributions are made. In Ohio, this
risk is diminished by the fact that the legal support obligation remains
low.17 5 Thus, for example, an OTMA account set up for the purposes
of funding private schooling, music and dance lessons, or similar expenses for a child fourteen or older, would probably not result in income attribution to the parent since such expenditures are not within
the parent's legal support obligation under Ohio law.' 76

indicating that the parent is legally obligated to provide in excess of the "necessaries of life". See
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Anderson 1980) (The annotations also do not list any case
law).
173. See Blake, supra note 172, at 160-64.
174. See generally id.
175. See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Anderson 1979).
176. Id. Another potential threat of income attribution exists where the parent sets up the
custodial account to fund the adult child's college education. The existence or nonexistence under
local law of a parental duty to provide for college expenses has a significant impact on the utility
and practicality of using the OTMA for funding college expenses. See, e.g., Sutliff v. Sutliff, 339
Pa. Super. 523, 489 A.2d 764 (1985) (discussed supra text accompanying notes 69-86). Most
children begin college at 18 years of age. Prior Ohio law mandated that the custodial property be
turned over to the minor at age 18. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(D) (Anderson Supp. 1985)
(amended 1986). Thus, the parents would lose control over the fund and thereby could not count
on the availability of having the custodial property to pay for college. By increasing the age of
distribution to 21, the parent now has the ability to control the property to assure its use for
college. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(D) (Anderson Supp. 1986). See e.g., Braun, 48 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 210. In Braun, a grantor/father residing in New Jersey set up a Clifford trust to fund
private secondary school for his minor children and pay tuition and other college expenses for his
adult children. Id. at 211. The tax court, holding that the amounts used for such purposes were
taxable to the grantor, relied primarily on the New Jersey Supreme Court case Newburgh v.
Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529, 443 A.2d 1031 (1982), cited with approval in Braun, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at
213. The Newburgh court found that under certain circumstances a parent may be held liable to
provide for the college education of an adult child. Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 543-44, 443 A.2d at
1038. Although Newburgh was decided under a broken family fact situation, the tax court in
Braun applied the same standard to an ongoing family situation. Braun, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at
213.
Generally, Ohio law imposes no duty to support an adult child beyond the age of majority.
The relevant Ohio statute dealing with the parent's legal support obligation is OHio REV. CODE
ANN. § 3103.03 (Anderson 1980). Neither this statute nor case law in Ohio has imposed
and
express duty to provide for a child beyond the age of majority (which is 18), except in rare circumstances such as where the child is handicapped. See Castle v. Castle, 15 Ohio St. 3d 279, 473
N.E.2d 803 (1984) (In limited circumstances, there is a common-law parental obligation to support a mentally retarded person who has reached the age of majority.). Mullanney v. Mullanney,
15 Ohio St. 3d 279, 473 N.E.2d 803 (1984) (parent obligation to support an adult handicapped
child may include college education); see Miller v. Miller, 154 Ohio St. 530, 536-37, 97 N.E.2d
213, 216-17 (1951) (holding that, absent a separation agreement, courts have no jurisdiction to
impose an obligation to support an adult child past the age of majority). Jurisdictions outside Ohio
may, however, impose such an obligation. See Blase, College Education and the Duty to Support,
123 TR.
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Estate Taxation

There are three major sections of the Internal Revenue Code upon
which estate taxation of UGMA transfers of property is based: First,
section 2038 requires inclusion in the donor's gross estate of property
which the donor has the power to "alter, amend, revoke or terminate"
7
the custodial arrangement. 17 Second, section 2036 requires inclusion of
property in the gross estate of the donor who transfers custodial property yet retains "possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income
from, the property.' 17 8 Last, section 2041 requires inclusion in the doproperty over which the donor has a genera! power of
nor's gross estate
79
appointment.1
1. Section 2038 Powers
a.

Section 2038 Powers Under the UGMA

Under Revenue Ruling 57-366,180 the value of property transferred by a parent to himself as custodian pursuant to the Model Act
was held includable in the gross estate of the donor for estate tax pur81 The Internal
poses, should the donor die while acting as custodian.
Revenue Service analogized transfers pursuant to the Model Act to
certain transfers in trusts taxable under section 2038.182 The power to
withhold benefits constitutes a retained power to alter, amend, revoke,
or terminate a trust, and the value of such property is includable under
section 2038.183 If a donor transfers property to himself as trustee and
retains the power to withhold or pay benefits until the trust termination
date, that property is included in his gross estate under section 2038 in
8
the event the donor dies while acting as trustee.' By analogy, the custodian had the absolute discretion to pay out or withhold the custodial
188 Thus, the property
property pursuant to section 4(b) of the UGMA.
186
was includable in the estate of the donor custodian.
The courts interpreted section 4(b) as giving the donor custodian a
177. I.R.C. § 2038(a) (1982).
178. Id.§ 2036(a)(1).
179. Id.§ 2041(a).
180. 1957-2 C.B. 618.
181. Id.at 619.
182. Id.
183. Commissioner v. Estate of Holmes, 326 U.S. 480 (1946).
184. Id.
185. UNIF. GiFts TO MINORS ACT § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 369 (1966).
186. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B. 212 confirms the Internal Revenue Service's position in
Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2 C.B. 618 by noting that the revisions made under the UGMA from the
Model Act do not warrant a departure from Rev. Rul. 57-366 since the donor custodian retains
the discretionary power to withhold payments under both acts. Rev. Rul. 59-357, 1959-2 C.B.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
212, 213.
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section 2038 retained power so as to trigger inclusion of the custodial
property value in the donor's estate.' 87 In Eichstedt188 the decedent, at
the time of his death, was holding securities as custodian for his two
minor daughters pursuant to the California UGMA.189 The court held
that the securities and the bank accounts in which dividends and income had been accumulated for the daughters were includable under
both sections 2036 and 2038.190 Under section 4(b) of the UGMA, the
court found that the donor custodian retained the power to apply the
transferred property and its income in satisfaction of his legal obligation to support the minors."9 1 Retention of this power made section
2036 applicable. 9 ' Plaintiff argued that he owed no obligation to support one of his daughters because she was married. 93 The court then
found the funds taxable under section 2038 because the decedent had
the power to withhold or pay over the custodial property at any time in
his sole discretion. 94 This power constituted a power to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate enjoyment of the property under section 2038."'
Thus, under the UGMA, a parent donor who was acting in a custodial
capacity at death would have the value of transferred property included
in his gross estate under section 2038.
b.

Section 2038 Powers Under the OTMA
The problem of inclusion of custodial property in the estate of the donor custodian remains under the OTMA. This is due to the fact that
the OTMA gives the custodian much broader powers to pay out funds
for the minor's "use and benefit."' 96 In light of the tax court's position
under the UGMA, it is evident that expenditures under the new Act
are sufficiently broad to confer upon the custodian the discretionary
power to pay out the entire fund and thus terminate the custodian187. Zien v.United States, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 12,964 (E.D. Wis. 1973); Eichstedt v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Estate of Carpousis v. Commissioner,
33 T.C.M. 1143 (1974); Estate of Prudowsky v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 890 (1971), affid per
curiam, 465 F.2d 62 (7th Cir. 1972); Stuit v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 580 (1970), afid. 452 F.2d
190 (7th Cir. 1971); Jacoby v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. 737 (1970); Estate of Chrysler v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 55 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 361 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966).
188. 354 F. Supp. at 484.
189. CALIF. CIv. CODE § 1158(b) (West 1982).
190. Eichstedt, 354 F. Supp. at 488-89.
191. Id. at 488.
192. Section 2036(a)(I) provides that the value of property which has been transferred by a
decedent for less than full consideration is includable in his gross estate if the decedent retained
the "possession and enjoyment of, or the right to income from, the [transferred] property." I.R.C.
§ 2036(l) (i982).
193. Eichstedt, 354 F. Supp. at 487.
194. Id. at 487-89.
195. Id.
196.
OHIo REV. CODE
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ship. 197 Such a power is within the scope of section 2038.198 Therefore,
under the OTMA, a donor who is acting in a custodial capacity at the
time of his death will have the value of transferred property included in
his gross estate under section 2038.
2.

Section 2036 Powers
a.

Section 2036: Retained Interests Under the UGMA

Several courts have relied on section 2036 as an alternative to section 2038 for inclusion of property transferred under the UGMA in the
gross estate. 199 Under section 2036, the value of property transferred
inter vivos by the decedent is included in his gross estate when he has
retained certain interests over a specified time period which "does not
0
in fact end before his death."2 If a donor custodian should die while
he would meet the statutory time period
acting as custodian
20 1
requirement.
The circumstances giving rise to inclusion of transferred property
in the decedent's gross estate exist when "the possession or enjoyment
of, or the right to the income from, the property" is retained by the
donor.2 0 2 The donor who dies while acting as custodian would have the
transferred UGMA property included in his gross estate if that donor
20 3
Under section 2036(a)(1) and
owed a duty of support to the donee.
is based upon the custodian's
taxation
pertinent Treasury Regulations,
2 4
power to use the funds for the support of the minor.
In Chrysler, the decedent held securities as custodian for his
daughter.2 0 5 Under the NeW York UGMA, the decedent had discretion
as custodian to make expenditures for the "support, maintenance, edu6
cation, and benefit of the minor. ' '2 0 The Tax Court found that:
[U]nder this section the decedent had the right as custodian to apply as
much of the income as he may deem advisable for the support, maintenance, education, and benefit of the minor and that, therefore, he had

197. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 188-95.
198. I.R.C. § 2038 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 188-95.
199. See, e.g., Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 320 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Cal.
1978); Prodowsky, 55 T.C. at 890; Chrysler. 44 T.C. at 55 (relying on the fact that section 4(b)
of the UGMA allows the custodian to discharge the parent's support obligation).
200. I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1982).
201. id.
202. Id. § 2036(a)(1).
203. Id.
204. Treas. Reg. § 20.2036-1(b)(2) (1986) (Income which may be used to discharge a donor's legal obligation to support a beneficiary is deemed to have been retained by the donor, just
as if the right to income had been payable directly to the donor.).
205. Chrysler. 44 T.C. at 58.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
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made a transfer under which he had in effect retained the right to use
the income from the property to discharge his legal obligation to support
[his daughter]. We think such a retained right is sufficient to require the
property transferred to be included in the decedent's gross estate under
07
section 2036(a).1
The courts have uniformly held that under the UGMA a donor parent
custodian, who owed a duty of support at death, would have the property included in his or her gross estate under section 2036.108
b.

Section 2036: Retained Interests Under the OTMA

To determine whether a donor parent who acts as an OTMA custodian will be considered as having retained an interest sufficient to
warrant inclusion under section 2036, it is important to focus on section
4(b)'s revised OTMA counterpart section 1339.34(B). 0 9 The existence
of a retained interest under the OTMA depends on whether the new
language in section 1339.34(B) authorizes the donor parent, acting as
custodian, to make expenditures which could satisfy his or her legal
support obligation to the minor.2 10 This issue is similar to that raised
when analyzing income taxation under the OTMA.2 11 The tax court is
again likely to focus on substance over form and conclude that custodial funds are available for support despite the new language of the
Act. Thus, it is unlikely that section 2036 retained interest taxation will
be avoided under the OTMA.
The taxpayer, however, may argue that such a result is not warranted in light of the new language in section 1339.34(B) which states
that expenditures under the Act are in addition to, not in substitution
for and do not affect the legal obligation of anyone to support the minor2 1 2 and section 1339.33(A) which provides that transfers under the
OTMA are irrevocable and convey to the minor indefeasible vested legal title to the custodial property. 1
In response to the taxpayer's arguments, the Service can rely on
the language found in section 1339.34(B).2 4 First, the new standard
for distribution under this section allows support type payments to be

207. Id.
208. See cases cited supra note 199.
209. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
210. I.R.C. § 2036(1) (1982). See also Chrysler, 44 T.C. at 55.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 140-57.
212. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.34(B) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
213. Id.§ 1339.33(A). In addition, the taxpayer can argue the inconsistency of concluding
that custodial funds are available for satis!ying the parent's support obligation since such a result
recognizes a benefit to the parent which cannot be reconciled with section 1339.33(A). Id.
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1 5 Second, such
made regardless of the surrounding circumstances.
broad discretion over the use of funds for the minors' support is not
21 6 Thereeffectively limited by the weak language used in this section.
fore the Service can argue that the donor custodian has retained an
interest in the custodial property which requires inclusion of such property in the donor's estate under section 2036.211
Section 2036 is, however, more limited in application to
UTMA/OTMA transfers than is section 2038. Section 2036 applies
218 whereas
only when the donor custodian is the parent of the donee,
9
section 2038 applies to all cases in which the donor is the custodian.
Furthermore, the amount includable under section 2038 will always be
greater than section 2036 under the OTMA.
Under section 2038, the custodian's power extends over the entire
corpus as well as the income, 22 0 and the amount includable in the gross
estate will be the value of the principle plus the income at date of
death. 221 The amount includable under section 2036, however, is limited to the value of the support obligation owed to the minor at decedent's date of death.22 2 Therefore, the Service will rely primarily on
section 2038, and section 2036 will remain an alternative basis for inclusion, as it was under the UGMA. 223 For taxpayers, it is still inadvisable for the donor to name himself as custodian or for a parent of the
minor to serve as custodian.

3.

Section 2041 Powers
a.

Section 2041: General Powers of Appointment Under the
UGMA

Taxation under section 2036 arises in the situation where the parent is both the donor and custodian. 224 Taxation under section 2038
220 Section 2041 may be
arises where the donor acts as the custodian.
2 26 Secapplicable where the parent is the custodian but not the donor.

215. Id.
216. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08.
217. I.R.C. § 2036 (1982).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 202-204.
219. See supra text and accompanying notes 180-87.
220. I.R.C. § 2038 (1982).
221. Id.
222. Id. § 2036(l).
223. See cases cited supra note 199.
224. I.R.C. § 2036 (1982).
225. Id. § 2038.
226. Section 2041 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property which the decedent at the time of his death has a general
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol12/iss2/13
power of appointment. Id. § 2041.
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tions 2038 and 2036 do not apply when the custodian did not make the
original transfer because there is no "retained" interest.22 7 Section
2041 is, therefore, the only potential source of estate tax inclusion in
the non-donor situation. 2 8 Although no litigation has reached the
courts as to the application of section 2041(a)(2) to the custodial arrangement,2 29 the Service has taken a position which poses a threat of
inclusion of UTMA/OTMA transferred property in the estate of a parent who is merely acting as custodian for the child.2 30
Inclusion under section 2041 is based on powers of appointment.
Section 2041 defines a general power of appointment as "a power
which is exercisable in favor of [the donee of the power], his estate, his
creditors, or creditors of his estate. ' ' 23 1 Under this definition, a power of
appointment that may be exercised to discharge the decedent's legal
obligation is considered a general power of appointment. 3 2 The entire
value of property over which the decedent has a general power of appointment is included in the decedent's gross estate, 2 3 regardless of
whether or not the power was exercised. 34 Section 4(b) of the UGMA
allows the custodian the power to expend funds in his unfettered discretion for the "support, maintenance, education and benefit of the minor." 2 35 A parent custodian, therefore, would appear to have a general
power of appointment since under the UGMA he would have the absolute discretion to discharge his legal obligation. 3 6
b.

Section 2041: General Power of Appointment Under the OTMA

The estate of a non-donor parent custodian is the primary target
for section 2041 taxation.23 7 Inclusion under the OTMA will depend on
whether the parent custodian can be deemed to hold a general power of

227. See Id. §§ 2036, 2038.
228. See Pennell, Custodians, Incompetents. Trustees and Others: Taxable Powers of Appointments?, 15 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 1602.2 (1981).
229. This author has found no reported case where inclusion of custodial funds in the gross
estate was based upon section 2041.
230. Rev. Rul. 79-154, 1979-1 C.B. 301, 302 (The Service has stated in dicta that "[ilf.
D had a legal obligation to support [his] children that could have been satisfied by D's appointment of the insurance fund, D would be regarded as having possessed a general power of appointment over the fund to the extent that the fund could have satisfied D's obligation.").
231. I.R.C. § 2041(b)(1) (1982).
232. Treas. Reg. § 2 0.2041-1(c) (1958).
233. I.R.C. § 2041(a)(2) (1982).
234. Treas. Reg. § 20.2041-3(a)(2) (1958).
235. UNIF. GiFTs TO MINORS ACT § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 369 (1966).
236. See generally Pennell, supra note 228; Weil & Heald, Uniform Gifts to Minors
Act-Some Second Thoughts on Its Usefulness as an Estate Planning Tool, 55 TAXES 271, 275
(1977).
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appointment. 3 The parent custodian will only be able to avoid section
2041 estate tax inclusion by showing that under the OTMA a custodian is not authorized to make expenditures in discharge of the legal
has no power to appoint
obligation to support the minor and 2therefore
39
benefit.
own
her
or
his
for
funds
the
It is arguable that the parent custodian does have the ability under
the OTMA to use custodial funds in satisfaction of his or her legal
obligation to support the minor since the OTMA does not definitely
2 0
prevent such expenditures from being made. Thus, under the OTMA
the parent/custodian is subject to the same risk of section 2041 estate
tax as under the UGMA. 4 '
C. Gift Taxation
1. Gift Taxation Under the UGMA
The Internal Revenue Service has taken the position that transfers
of property pursuant to the UGMA constituted a completed gift at the
42
time of the transfer and as such are subject to gift tax. As a completed gift of a present interest, however, the UGMA transfer qualified
for the $10,000 annual per donee exclusion under section 2503(b) of
the Internal Revenue Code.2 43 The Service's position that the gift was a
completed transfer of a present interest was based expressly upon section 3(a) of the UGMA, which provided that the minor took indefeasiproperty conveyed by the donor to the minor
bly vested title in 24the
4
under the UGMA.
This ruling failed to consider section 4(b) of the UGMA, which
allowed the custodian to discharge the legal obligation of a parent to
support the minor. 4 5 Section 4(b) has, however, been expressly relied
upon by the Service to find a retained power for estate tax purposes
2 4 Consisand to recognize gross income to the parent of the minor.
tency would appear to require a different gift tax result. A parent donor custodian with the retained right to discharge his legal support obligation out of the fund 247 should result in an incomplete transfer for
gift tax purposes. The regulations specify that "a gift is incomplete in
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 104-21.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 224-36.
242. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 C.B. 449.
243. Id. See also I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982).
244. Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1956-1 C.B. 449.
245. See UNIF. GIFTS TO MINORS ACT § 4(b), 8A U.L.A. 317, 369 (1966).
246. See supra text accompanying notes 199-208 (discussing the retained power under the
UGMA).
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every instance in which a donor reserves the right to revest the beneficial title to the property in himself."24 8 The transfer, therefore, could
be said to be incomplete to the extent of the parent donor custodian's
support obligation. Any amounts transferred in excess of the support
obligation would be deemed to be complete and subject to gift tax. 4 9
2.

Gift Taxation Under The OTMA

A transfer under the OTMA would also be deemed complete for
gift tax purposes. The language in section 3(a) of the UGMA upon
which the Service relied in finding the UGMA transfer to be a completed gift has not been altered by the OTMA.150 As a completed gift,
the OTMA transfer will qualify for the $10,000 annual per donee exclusion under section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. 5 1 Thus,
any donor may make gifts totaling up to $10,000 per year in the aggregate to any individual without incurring any gift tax,2 52 provided that
the gift transfers a present interest. 5 3
In light of section 4(b) of the UGMA which allowed the parent to
benefit from the custodial account, determination of the UGMA gift as
complete was inconsistent. 54 Whether this inconsistency exists under
the OTMA will depend on the Service's construction of Ohio's
amended counterpart to section 4(b) of the UGMA. Section
1339.34(B) on its face appears to have removed the express authoriza248. Treas. Reg. § 25.251 I1-2(c) (1958).
249. These amounts would not be deemed as a "retained interest," thus qualifying as a
completed gift. See I.R.C. § 2503 (1982).
This analysis was likewise applicable when the donor custodian was not the parent. Here, the
UGMA transfer was incomplete on the basis that although no beneficial interest in the property
was retained by the donor custodian, he did retain the power to control who would receive beneficial ownership of the UGMA property. Failure to surrender this dominion and control over the
property renders the transfer incomplete and, therefore, it could not be considered a taxable gift.
Once again, the amount in excess of the parent's legal obligation would be considered complete.
250. See OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1339.33(A) (Anderson Supp. 1986).
251. See I.R.C. § 2503(b) (1982).
252. Id.
253. The gift of a future interest, such as a reversion or a remainder, which is "limited to
commence in use, possession, or enjoyment at some future date" may constitute a completed gift
for gift tax purposes but is not eligible for the $10,000 per donee exclusion. Treas. Reg. §
25 2
. 503-3(a).
254. See Rev. Rul. 56-86, 1959-1 C.B. 449. The Service may appear to be generous in
considering a UGMA transfer to be a completed gift of a present interest for purposes of the per
donee exclusion when the minor donee cannot "presently" control disposition of the gift and expenditures from gifted funds which may in fact inure to the benefit of the parent, who would
otherwise make those expenditures as a part of his or her support obligation. This generosity
results from the manifest reluctance of Congress to require that (possibly irresponsible) minors be
given actual control of gifted property in order for donors to realize tax benefits. See, e.g., I.R.C. §
2503(c) (1982) (providing that an irrevocable gift to a minor does not constitute a gift of a future
interest as :ong as property and income may be expended for the donee minor's benefit and control
of disposition
passes to the
donee at 21 years of age).
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tion for the custodian to use the funds for the parent's benefit.1 In
addition, appended to section 1339.34(B) is a clause which states that
payments made under the OTMA are not in substitution for the obliga25 6
tion of any person to support the minor. To the extent that the new
language does not expressly authorize custodial expenditures to benefit
the parent of the minor, there will be no inconsistency in recognizing
the OTMA transfer as a complete gift. As amended, however, section
1339.34(B) does not, expressly prohibit the custodian from making ex25
penditures in discharge of the parent's legal obligation. 7 Absent an
absolute prohibition of such expenditures, the parent may be deemed as
having an interest in the property for both income and estate tax purposes. If such is the case, the inconsistency remains.

CONCLUSION

The Ohio General Assembly sought to revitalize Ohio's Gifts to
Minors Act by enacting the OTMA. The inconsistency which plagued
the old Act with potential litigation has been eliminated. The method
chosen by the legislature appears to be an attempt to strike a balance
between restricting the use of custodial funds in discharge of the parental support obligation while at the same time retaining the custodian's
broad discretion as provided under the OGMA.
The restriction of custodial expenditures in satisfaction of the parental support obligation will, however, only be effective in a broken
family situation. In the ongoing family situation there are no judges or
support decrees which define or prevent impermissable support expenditures, and it is doubtful that the new language of the OTMA is strong
enough to prevent such expenditures. This, however, is the sacrifice
which must be taken in order to maintain the flexibility and utility of
the custodial arrangement.
Unfortunately, for tax purpose, the General Assemblys' failure to
provide an absolute prohibition or custodial expenditures which discharge the parental support duty leaves the OTMA plagued with the
same adverse tax consequences associated with the UGMA.
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